A person who has murdered his father or a person from whom he wants to inherit, stands totally disqualified. Further, if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under the Hindu Law, it shall be deemed as if such person had died before the intestate. That means he will be deemed to have pre-deceased him. The effect of section 25 read with section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally disqualified to succeed to the estate of the deceased. A person who is guilty of committing the murder cannot be treated to have any relationship whatsoever with the deceased's estate.
By adverting to this fact it was held in the present case that the respondent could not inherit any property of his father based on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience as he has murdered him and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist.
Most importantly, once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or son. The respondent son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the deceased.
When a son can not succeed, then the wife who succeeds to the property through the husband can not also claim to the property of her father-in-law.
Indian Legislatures as supreme and sovereign as the British Parliament
Bhola Prasad v. R, (1942) FCR 17
The Indian legislatures within their own sphere have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of British Parliament itself. If that were true in 1878 [The Queen v. Burah, (1878) 3 App. Cas 889], it can not be less true in 1942. Every intendment ought to, therefore, be made in favour of a legislature which is exercising the powers conferred on it. Its enactments ought not to be subjected to the minute scrutiny which may be appropriate to an examination of the bye-laws of a body exercising only delegated powers, nor is the generality of its power to legislate on a particular subject to be cut down by the arbitrary introduction of far-fetched and impertinent limitations.
Refusal to accept a summons is not an Offence
Queen v. Arumuga Nadan, (1882) 5 Mad 200
The refusal to accept a notice issued by a police officer, requiring the attendance at an inquiry does not amount to an offence. Similarly, refusal to sign a summons, refusal to receive a summons and throwing down a summons after service, do not constitute the offence of intentionally preventing the service of summons.
Death sentence in U.S.A. is contrary to 14th Amendment of its Constitution
McGantha v. California, 402 US 183 (1971)
The struggle for abolition of death penalty in the United States began in 1971 when it was brought to the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court in McGantha case that virtually all States left to the unguided discretion of the judge or the jury the decision where a particular prisoner should or should not be awarded death penalty. McGantha challenged his death sentence as contrary to 14th Amendment to U.S. Constitution (Amendment No. XIV, 1868) arguing that where death was a possible sanction, due process of law required that the decision maker's discretion be guided by concrete standards. However, the Court rejected McGantha's 14th Amendment challenge. America's 14th Amendment to its Constitution states that "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law".